Mr Changsha wrote:
But then just recently I played a trips game and was going through one of my disinterested periods. I had an incredibly light touch over the first 3 rounds. And what did I find when I finally paid attention to the game? All three players had created nice little empires for themselves.
So I speculate that the dictator model leads to a 'dominant player scenario', while the independent command is more likely to result in three viable empires.
At this point in your reasoning, an idea came to mind:
Is it possible that the historic role of your authoritarianism leads to outcomes such as the three viable empires?
For example, when you let the reins free, the players lead themselves to an outcome which might (usually) be restricted to the "three viable empires" outcome because they are
used to being led by the Glorious Dictator. In other words, since they have developed within the authoritarian institution (institution = rules of the game*), they may have yet to develop a compensating/substitutable institution; therefore, they will lead themselves to this outcome.
*(please read
this if you wish to clarify my meaning).
As a contrary example, players from the "oligarchic" style in my usual games typically lend support to 1 or 2 players in a quad, and 1 (sometimes 2) in a trips. Based on our historic experiences within an oligarchic institution, we "naturally" lead ourselves into an outcome. By "oligarchic," I mean that at least two of our players make most of the shots and input most of the information, while the third and/or fourth insert significantly less feedback and tend to play a subordinate role.
With this in mind:
Mr Changsha wrote:From there, I naturally began to wonder if in some situations it would be optimal for the dictator to actually call for independent play for a couple of rounds, but still of course be able to dictate when he chose. But in what situations/styles/maps etc would option two be preferable?
This seems very complicated to me indeed.
This is complicated because regardless of the map and styles, the underlying problem is that you are flipping political institutions within one game. If the other players are not used to the significant loss of your decision-making, then within the new institution of "independent play," they may lead themselves to undesirable outcomes.
For example, in our trips game, had you explicitly called for independent play, I would have allowed the oligarchical method to flourish (however, in that game, it would've likely developed into a tripartite on relatively equal political power, i.e. authority to make shots). In turn, this may have resulted in the problem of conflicting goals without any means of adjudication because we three have yet to develop a substitutable institution which would resolve our problems and make us profitable. In other words, we may have problems because we lack the ability to self-organize for many reasons.
Because of the potential for this problem, within my oligarchical model, I implement a different form of order by
attempting to play a more passive role, offer suggestions, receive feedback, and allow for the naturally occurring/spontaneous order to arise from this process. This different form of order is similar to the theory of
spontaneous order, which is order that emerges not from human design but from human interaction. (It's like "unintended order," in a sense).
In conclusion, based on my previous explanations and premises up to this point, your plan of "independent play" may lead to unintended consequences and frustrated outcomes--given that your teammates have yet to accustom themselves with a more oligarchical institution or spontaneous order-style of play. The answer you seek may lie in allowing the spontaneous order to emerge from the temporarily relieved, political institution of dictatorship.
Through trial-and-error (and loss of points), your independent play method may lead to better outcomes in the long-run because the players are allowed to adjust to the new institutional framework. Within the realm of spontaneous order, they may "unintentionally" develop a new institution which would profitably compensate for the loss of your temporarily relieved dictatorial institution. The question is: as a Kirznerian entrepreneur*, are you willing to forego the short-term loss of points for the perceived gains in the long-run?
Kirzner and his model of the entrepreneur:
According to Israel Kirzner, the entrepreneur attempts to discover profit/point opportunities through observations of the daily world, random thought creation, trail-and-error, etc. A relevant example would be you as an entrepreneur pondering if adjusting your current style of play would increase profits/points. Profits can be measured in points but are also perceived as psychic benefits (e.g. ego-boosting, self-accomplishment, satisfaction of providing others with a more useful strategy, etc.). At the moment, you are trying to array a set of means to your ultimate end. This requires estimating the present and future costs while trying to perceive present and future benefits of each means to a proximate end.
Mr Changsha wrote:I have always felt that one of the key principles of good strategy is unpredictability. I have numerous methods when I play standard or 8 man dubs...it is important to have this as well in trips and quads. So I am naturally attracted to a concept like this. For how can the opposition read my play if i am switching between a dictatorial model and an independent model within in the same game? Or maybe I play the first in a set as a dictator and the second using the independent command?
With spontaneous order, any newly created institution may be possible, so this approach (after much trial-and-error) may allow for a highly adaptable and unpredictable team--as observed from the other team. With your team, you'll intuitively know the means which generate the ends (e.g. deceptive play, strategy A but not strategy B for this round, strategy C for that round, etc.).
But there is this problem which has riddled history. Dictatorial institutions or top-down approaches tend to destroy many of the possible avenues of discovery through spontaneous order. In other words, imposed order often overrides and ruins the benefits of spontaneous order. If you can resolve this problem while implementing a top-down/dictatorial approach, then you may be on your way to winning a Nobel Prize.
Mr Changsha wrote:So, is one model more suitable than another in certain situations?
If i am playing a fellow dictator which should I use?
If I am playing on a large, medium-sized or small map?
If I am behind on round 3?
If the map is bonus-driven or territory based?
If the opposition has played me before?
If it is a new map?
If it is one I am familiar with?
Finally, what do you think of the concept of SWITCHING between models? How effective would that be?
My above style of play is nascent, so it's difficult for me to precisely answer your questions...
Feedback from us may be helpful, but future knowledge is best revealed through trial-and-error and re-adjustment
through time with you and your own teammates. Why?
Because the spontaneous order method allows for an increased availability of knowledge/information which is dispersed at various levels among all players in your team. Knowledge/information is dependent on the "particular circumstances of time and place." So,
a priori we cannot offer you universal/precise answers which may be applicable for your future decision-making because your future decisions depend on particular circumstances. In order to allow for a more robust set of opportunities, you may have to marginally relinquish your control and over time allow for new institutions to develop, so that you and your teammates can adapt more readily to the changing circumstances.
Nevertheless, your dictatorial method may distort the incentives through which players would have otherwise offered information. In other words, if my words won't mean much--or if my words may mean much but you will do what you want anyway, then I face a non-profitable endeavor, i.e. I may as well keep quiet. Your dictatorial institution may not be allowing for this avenue that reveals more information.
Finally, there is another fundamental problem. Some portion of knowledge within each individual cannot be formalized, thus cannot be expressed explicitly through a language like English. However, this knowledge can be revealed through the "language" of prices which emerge from the interactions of individuals coordinating and conflicting with their different means and ends within any market. How can you implement a price mechanism within a game? lol i dunno. Again, here lies another path to your Nobel Prize.
To compare this to the real world, it may be similar to me asking the federal government to relinquish almost all authority and allow for the interaction of individuals and city-states to pursue various avenues of discovery based on their own incentives and exchanges of information. This competitive approach of different plans would reveal the relative costs and benefits of these plans, from which others can learn, modify, and then implement new and better plans. This very game we play and this conversation of different plans/approaches for winning is exemplary of this. Spontaneous order is all around us, for who knew that your response could lead to my particular response? I didn't; it just happened!
I hope that this long-winded post is useful.
(I can't take credit, where credit is due, so here's a reading list):
The Logic of Collective Action
Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance
Competition & Entrepreneurship
Individualism and Economic Order--especially, "The Use of Knowledge in Society"